New Delhi : The terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, which is a strong symbol of India’s sovereignty, is still one of the most critical challenges that India has faced when it came to its security. This situation forced the Indian government, led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, to undertake Operation Parakram, which involved moving 500,000 to 800,000 troops to the border. However, after nine months of the most significant military standoff since the end of World War II, India called a retreat. The question is, what led India to withdraw from the brink of war?
On this day, the country is celebrating the martyrdom of the courageous martyrs who laid down their lives in defense of the temple of democracy. The attack, carried out by five terrorists affiliated with the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), killed nine people, including security personnel and members of parliament.
The government’s initial response was that it would retaliate. India called Pakistan’s bluff, preparing for a massive military strike, code-named Operation Parakram, with troops lined up against the Pakistan border, which was met with the presence of around 300,000 Pakistani troops.
Background And Immediate Aggressive Response
The parliament attack in 2001 was not an isolated event but a consequence of the tension that had been brewing in the past, which included the Kargil War of 1999 and the hijacking at Kandahar. After the attack on December 13, the NDA government, led by Prime Minister Vajpayee, demanded the following from Pakistan: The leaders of LeT and JeM need to be arrested, their offices need to be shut, and their properties seized.
“When Pakistan failed to respond to these calls, India escalated:
December 21, 2001: India called back its High Commissioner from Pakistan.
January 2002: India had mobilized a force of 800,000 troops along the LoC when Operation Parakram came into effect.
The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) deliberated on a cross-border strike, or a limited war. Brajesh Mishra, the National Security Adviser, said that the CCS had agreed unanimously that terrorism would not be accepted, and entering the borders would be made only when necessary.
Strategic Dilemma: What Was The Goal?
The Indian Military had been mobilized by the end of the initial weeks of January 2002, waiting for the political “green signal” to proceed. This marked a historic chance for India to leverage its guaranteed military advantage over Pakistan in order to bring compellence, which compelled Pakistan to take concrete steps against terrorism.
Despite this, several uncertainties confronted the political as well as military leadership, as explained by experts such as Lt. Gen. H.S. Panag (Retd.):
Political Restraints: The political leadership tended towards taking limited steps, which might even be limited to Jammu, Kashmir.
Ambiguity Regarding “End State”: The CCS sessions failed to produce a clearly defined set of military goals, such as what territory to seize, what level of destruction of the enemy, or what is the aim of the war. The Naval Chief, Admiral Sushil Kumar, is reported to have demanded “clear-cut political objectives to define military objectives.”
US Logistics: The need to avoid hindering the transit of American logistic support to the war in Afghanistan, which came through Pakistan, limited the naval operations centered on Karachi, as well as air operations to the west of the Indus River.
The Readiness Gap And Nuclear Shadow
Although the Army, Air Force, and Navy were prepared within a week, the Army had serious difficulties in India’s strategic plan. The striking force of India, that is, the three Strike Corps, were far from the border, taking a minimum of three weeks to become combat operational. The onset of the conflict with partially mobilized strike corps was considered unsatisfactory to avoid ambiguity.
Most importantly, the situation is developing against the backdrop of a nuclear threat:
Nuclear Deterrence: Both countries had nuclear weapons after the year 1998. The Pakistani government made direct nuclear threats during the crunch. This, according to scholars such as Ganguly and Hagerty, helped prevent the outbreak of war inasmuch as nuclear war was a possibility that both parties considered.
Ambiguity: The probability of nuclear war, as calculated by V.K. Sood, was a high 50% plus. Although certain scholars argue on the realism of the delivery systems at that juncture, the threat of escalation acted as a great deterrent.
The Cost Of Standoff And The Decision To Withdraw
The last call to withdraw the troops after nine months of service came when Pakistan’s previous head of state, General Pervez Musharraf, allegedly pledged a crackdown on the terrorist organizations operating from his territory.
The incident, which never developed into a war, came with a high cost because “Financial Cost”: The cost of mobilization is roughly $2 billion. Human Cost: Reporting in The Telegraph on May 30, 2003, stated that India had lost 1,874 of its soldiers to accidents, mines, and other such incidents when Operation Parakram lasted for over 300 days, which is a very high toll compared to the 600 killed in the 1999 Kargil War.
The absence of a conclusive strike, even when the troops were fully mobilised, reinforced in the minds of many experts that nuclear escalation risk played a pivotal role in making India call off the attack, which resulted in a victory for diplomatic means.
